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Market Reaction to Bank Liquidity 
Regulation  
Abstract 
We measure market reactions to announcements concerning liquidity regulation, a key 
innovation in the Basel framework. Our initial results show that liquidity regulation attracts 
negative abnormal returns. However, the price responses are less pronounced when coinciding 
announcements concerning capital regulation are backed out, suggesting that markets do not 
consider liquidity regulation to be binding. Bank- and country-specific characteristics also 
matter. Liquid balance sheets and high charter values increase abnormal returns while smaller 
long-term funding mismatches reduce abnormal returns. Banks located in countries with large 
government debt and tight interbank conditions or with prior domestic liquidity regulation 
display lower abnormal returns.  
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Market Reaction to Bank Liquidity Regulation 
 
I. Introduction 
  We present the first empirical analysis of how stock markets respond to the new global 
standards of bank liquidity regulation which are gradually adopted between 2015 and 2018. 
Unlike capital regulation, which has been a cornerstone of the regulatory framework for years, 
regulating bank liquidity was typically not a major concern prior to the recent crisis in most 
countries. The regulatory package (known as Basel III) that the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) developed in response to the recent financial crisis1 constitutes a 
fundamental change in that respect. For the first time, the BCBS introduces global standards 
for bank liquidity to improve liquidity risk management and banks’ ability to withstand 
liquidity shocks (Calomiris, Heider, and Hoerova (2015)). Policy makers view these new 
standards as a major improvement in regulation after the recent crisis, as the following quote 
illustrates: 
 
[The Basel III Framework is] a landmark achievement that will help protect 
financial stability and promote sustainable economic growth. The […] global 
liquidity framework will significantly reduce the probability and severity of 
banking crises in the future 
                                                 
1
  During the crisis, several banks faced substantial liquidity outflows and shortages owing to overreliance on 
volatile funding sources, improper asset-liability management, and off-balance-sheet positions which gave rise to 
liquidity risk (Strahan (2012)). Consequently, banks hoarded liquidity (Acharya and Merrouche (2013)), and 
reduced liquidity provision to other banks and to the real sector (Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian 
(2011)).   
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Nout Wellink Chairman of the BCBS and President of the Netherlands Bank2 
 
  The new rules address different aspects of liquidity risk. The liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR) aims to ensure that banks have high quality liquid assets available to accommodate 
short-term cash outflows. The net stable funding ratio (NSFR) requires a minimum volume of 
stable funding sources given a bank’s asset structure to mitigate the risk of funding 
mismatches over a one year time horizon. These two ratios aim to achieve different objectives 
and they are, at least from a theoretical perspective, equally important for financial stability. 
An empirical question that we seek to answer in the paper is whether the market perceives the 
LCR as more important than the NSFR, or vice versa.  
  By requiring banks to switch to higher quality and more liquid assets, and towards more 
stable funding sources, the new standards are likely to affect banks’ operations, in particular 
the structure of the balance sheet in terms of maturity structure and asset and funding choices. 
Therefore, complying with these rules has potential to affect bank profitability and valuation. 
Industry representatives expressed disquiet about the costs arising from the new rules which 
would reduce profits (Institute of International Finance (IIF) (2012)). The final version of 
Basel III, released after a five year period of intensive discussions and lobbying, entailed 
several amendments to the original proposal and a weakening of the initial guidelines.  
  To examine how market participants react to liquidity regulation, we use event study 
methodology and exploit seven official announcements by the BCBS regarding the 
introduction of global liquidity standards. We turn to this methodology because the new 
regulation is gradually implemented over several years from 2015 onwards and an 
examination of the long-term impact of the LCR and the NSFR on bank profitability is 
                                                 
2
 See BIS press release, Dec. 16, 2010 (http://www.bis.org/press/p101216.htm).   
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infeasible due to the lack of historical information for the two ratios and the impossibility to 
compute them with the current level of disclosure in bank balance sheets. Therefore, only an 
event study approach and the combination of market and accounting data can be used to 
examine how markets expect bank profits to be affected. 
  We study European banks because their funding metrics compared unfavorably during 
and after the crisis with international peers, making them less prepared than U.S. and Japanese 
banks to meet the requirements in Basel III (European Banking Authority (EBA) (2012)). 
Moreover, the sovereign debt crisis amplified between 2010 and 2012 the funding problems in 
Europe where banks are subject to different national liquidity regimes, making convergence a 
desirable, yet challenging, objective to level the playing field. Finally, our cross-country 
comparison that focuses on large listed banks that display bank- and country-specific 
heterogeneities allows examining how banks headquartered in similar yet different banking 
systems respond to the new rules.  
  Our empirical strategy proceeds in three steps. First, we examine cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs), and cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMARs) over 3-day event windows 
to estimate aggregate and average market reactions to seven announcements by the BCBS 
relating to proposals, amendments, and revisions of rules concerning bank liquidity regulation 
for the period Feb. 2008–Jan. 2013. Second, we disentangle stock price reactions that also 
refer to confounding events such as announcements concerning capital regulation from those 
that exclusively address liquidity regulation. To this end, we calculate CARs and CMARs 
over event dates that only relate to statements regarding liquidity regulation. Third, we 
analyze whether banks respond heterogeneously. We correlate the cross-sectional variation in 
CARs and CMARs with bank-specific and country-specific characteristics. These tests 
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illustrate how CARs and CMARs increase or decrease as an effect of the pre-existing liquidity 
conditions, funding mismatch, charter values, and country-specific characteristics that affect 
the two-way feedback between the sovereign’s creditworthiness and refinancing conditions in 
the interbank market.   
  Several arguments suggest that bank stock prices may respond to liquidity regulation. 
Even if the regulation is not implemented yet, bank stock prices can reflect the market 
perception regarding the possible consequences of liquidity regulation.  
  One view is that regulation serves the public interest to promote welfare at the expense of 
the regulated industry (Needham (1983)). Clearly, achieving and maintaining safe and sound 
banking, and mitigating systemic risk serves the public interest. Indeed, these arguments are 
put forward by the policy community for regulating bank liquidity. On the other hand is the 
capture theory. Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) posit that regulation is desired by the 
regulated industry to reap benefits at the expense of opposing parties. Consistent with this 
view, lobbying by the banking industry against this regulation resulted in amendments that 
watered down the initial proposal and led to an eventually less restrictive regime.  
  Analyzing the effects of changes in regulation using event studies has received much 
attention in the economics and banking literature (Schwert (1981), Dann and James (1982), 
James (1983), Allen and Wilhelm (1988), Slovin, Sushka, and Bendeck (1990), Wagster 
(1996), Bayazitova and Shivadasani (2012), Norden, Roosenboom, and Wang (2013), and 
Horváth and Huizinga (2015)). However, event study methodology is not without challenges. 
First, the public debates about regulation during and after the crisis made investors anticipate 
tighter regulation, suggesting that markets may have expected regulatory changes prior to the 
announcements of the BCBS. We deal with this problem using a 3-day event window centred 
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on the announcement day. Moreover, we test for anticipation effects using placebo events we 
pretend to occur prior to the actual events. Second, liquidity regulation is only one component 
of the regulatory framework. Some announcements relating to liquidity regulation coincide 
with announcements on capital regulation or other aspects of Basel III. Establishing a causal 
effect of market reactions to liquidity regulation requires identifying such confounding news. 
A key contribution of our study is to disentangle the effects of announcements that also 
contain information concerning other components of Basel III (specifically, capital adequacy 
regulation) from the effects that are solely attributable to liquidity regulation. We refer to 
those tests as the Liquidity only bucket. These tests shed light on the question of whether 
market participants view liquidity regulation as binding and help establish their value 
relevance. Last, share prices may also respond to corporate events, such as changes in 
corporate governance or dividend cuts. We also show tests that omit bank-specific events that 
coincide with the BCBS announcements.   
  Our initial set of tests points towards negative stock price reactions to the introduction of 
liquidity regulation. The aggregate effect on shareholders of European banks based on the 
CARs for all seven events is equivalent to an average decrease in market capitalization 
between 269 and 354 million Euros, depending on the proxy for the market portfolio (MSCI 
Europe and MSCI World, respectively). These figures represent a decline in market 
capitalization of –5.27%, and –6.95%, respectively. However, our inferences are more 
nuanced when we separate out the announcements relating to capital regulation and other 
components of Basel III. Tests based on the Liquidity only bucket highlight that the average 
stock price reaction is either only marginally significant or insignificant. These analyses 
suggest that markets do not consider these new rules to be binding. Therefore, their value 
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relevance is more limited than our initial results suggest. Our interpretation is plausible 
because the standards were not implemented yet. Precisely, while a smooth and gradual 
process of implementation was finalised for the LCR, the NSFR will only become a binding 
requirement by 2018 and observers anticipate further modifications to be made (Santos and 
Elliot (2012)). 
  Further tests illustrate that bank-specific variables explain the cross-sectional variation in 
stock price reactions to test the motivation behind the LCR and the NFSR. Banks with a 
greater LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO (defined as the ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-
term funding) which serves as a proxy for the LCR, display less negative CARs and CMARs. 
This is in line with the idea that banks with more liquid balance sheets react better to the new 
rules. Our proxy for the NSFR, the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO, enters our tests with a 
negative sign, suggesting more negative CARs and CMARs for higher levels of 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO. As explained in detail below, this result reflects that the 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO is largely driven by Tier 1 capital, an expensive source of funds.3 
Country-specific factors also matter: banks from countries with more government debt 
experience more negative CARs and CMARs, and the negative wealth effects are also more 
pronounced if banks are headquartered in countries that already had national provisions for 
liquidity risk in place prior to the new rules.  
  Our research complements the evolving literature on Basel III. These studies address the 
effect of new regulation on economic growth and the cost of lending (Banerjee and Mio 
(2015), Duijm and Wierts (2016)). Our work is also related to the broader literature on 
                                                 
3
  Including off-balance sheet items (such as guarantees and other contingent liabilities) and excluding liquid assets 
in the denominator of the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO does not alter our results. 
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banking regulation and its impact on banking sector development, performance and stability 
(Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004)), and the effect of regulation compliance on soundness 
(Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008)). Our work differs from those studies by 
focusing specifically on the reaction by market participants to the introduction of a novel 
component of the Basel III framework: the regulation of liquidity risk.   
  We proceed as follows. Section II describes the institutional background, and Section III 
introduces testable predictions. Section IV describes the data and Section V the methodology. 
The results are presented in Section VI. Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Institutional Background 
  On Feb. 21, 2008, the BCBS published a document entitled Liquidity Risk Management 
and Supervisory Challenges as an initial response to the 2007–2009 crisis. This document 
summarises the findings of a review by the committee on national supervisory regimes and 
banks’ practices to manage liquidity in times of difficulty. In light of banks’ poor liquidity 
management and the diversity of national liquidity regimes, the document illustrates possible 
actions to strengthen liquidity risk management and coordinate supervision.  
  On June 17, 2008, the BCBS proposed 17 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision, a review of a previous document on liquidity management 
introducing criteria for funding structure and liquidity standards. The Committee issued the 
final version of Principles on Sept. 25, 2008 after receiving comments. Next, the BCBS 
released the International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring on Dec. 17, 2009. This framework aims to elevate the resilience of international 
banks to liquidity shocks and harmonize international liquidity risk supervision. It also 
introduces global standards for liquidity risk supervision to achieve two objectives: 
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i) To strengthen banks’ ability to withstand liquidity shocks over a short-term period, the 
BCBS developed the LCR. The standard requires banks to hold sufficient high quality liquid 
assets (HQLA), such as cash or government bonds, to meet a severe cash outflow for 30 days. 
The standard was introduced in 2015. 
ii) To promote long-term resilience and reduce maturity mismatch, the BCBS proposed the 
NSFR. It incentivizes the use of stable funding sources by limiting short-term wholesale 
funding. Precisely, it requires banks to hold equity and liability financing expected to be 
reliable sources of funds over a one-year time horizon. The amount of stable funds required is 
conditional on liquidity characteristics of assets on and off the balance-sheet. The standard 
will be introduced in 2018. 
Appendix A presents a detailed description of the two requirements.4 The initial reaction 
to the announcements about regulating liquidity was negative.5 Next, the BCBS decided to 
gradually introduce the standards to avoid detrimental effects on lending.6 Consequently, the 
initial proposal was amended, and in two cases (Events #5 and #7) these adjustments resulted 
in a loosening of the liquidity requirements relative to previous announcements. We briefly 
discuss the key features of these events.  
  A first set of amendments was set out in the Annex to the BCBS press release on July 26, 
                                                 
4
 Both measures are included in the Dec. 2010 Basel III Agreement (Event #6). From this point in time, 
supervisors monitored the ratios. However, there was a great deal of objection by the industry and the BCBS 
indicated the likelihood of further refinements in the formulas prior to the start of the mandatory period. Further, 
data gathered during the observation period may lead to further changes (Santos and Elliott (2012)).  
5
 See, for example, Financial Times, Dec. 17, 2009 (“Basel was Faulty”). 
6
 See the press release “Consultative proposals to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector announced by the 
Basel Committee”, Dec. 17, 2009 downloadable at http://www.bis.org/press/p091217.htm.  
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2010 (Event #5). The objective of the revisions was “to achieve a calibration and definition 
that penalises imprudent liquidity profiles, while minimising system level distortions” (p. 5). 
In particular, the LCR was relaxed by widening the range of qualifying liquid assets, and the 
NSFR was modified to favor retail over wholesale banking, mainly by loosening requirements 
for customer deposits and residential mortgages.   
In response to these objections and to take into account problems in the Eurozone, the 
BCBS modified the short-term liquidity standard (Event #7). The Committee announced the 
introduction of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools 
on Jan. 7, 2013. The main changes to the LCR entailed a wider set of HQLA and more lenient 
assumptions for the calculation of net cash outflows. The document also clarified the 
possibility for banks to fall below the minimum LCR requirement during periods of stress. 
Moreover, the BCBS decided to delay the full implementation of the standards.7  
We summarize the seven key events examined in this research in the following timeline. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table 1 assesses the impact of each event on the probability of stricter liquidity rules after 
each event and the corresponding stock price effect. Appendix B describes the BCBS events 
                                                 
7
  The LCR was introduced on Jan. 1, 2015 with a minimum requirement of 60%. It will rise in annual steps of 
10% to reach 100% on Jan. 1, 2019.  
Dec. 16, 2010 
Release of Basel III: 
International Framework 
for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards 
and Monitoring 
 
July 26, 2010 
Release of the July 2010 
Annex, containing the 
key broad agreements of 
the Governors and Heads 
of Supervision 
Dec. 17, 2009 
Release of International 
Framework for Liquidity 
Risk Measurement, 
Standards and 
Monitoring  
Sept. 25, 2008 
Release of Principles for 
Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and 
Supervision  
June 17, 2008 
Release of Principles for 
Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and 
Supervision 
Feb. 21, 2008  
Release of Liquidity 
Risk: Management and 
Supervisory Challenge 
Jan. 7, 2013 
Release of Basel III: The 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
and Liquidity Risk 
Monitoring Tools 
Time 
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in greater detail.  
[TABLE 1: ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF EACH EVENT] 
 
 
III. Testable Predictions 
We develop predictions for how bank stock prices respond to liquidity regulation. Next, 
we discuss how bank- and country-level features amplify or mitigate the stock price returns. 
 
A. Hypotheses on Market Reactions to Liquidity Regulation 
Several arguments suggest that liquidity regulation attracts negative stock price reactions. 
Introducing quantitative liquidity requirements aims to correct banks’ suboptimal liquidity 
choices to restore optimal liquidity. A priori, it appears plausible to expect that such 
regulation interferes with banks’ business operations which are geared towards profit 
maximization, and shareholders are likely to respond negatively. 
The negative view on holding liquidity is driven by the fact that liquidity facilitates 
managerial moral hazard (Jensen (1986)). Moreover, liquidity holdings are considered to be 
costly for several reasons. Myers and Rajan (1998) highlight the ‘dark side’ of liquidity. By 
holding more liquid assets, firms are less likely to commit to a specific investment strategy 
that protects creditors because more liquid firms have a higher value in liquidation. A 
manager will therefore use the more liquid assets to alter the implicit property rights she has 
to maximize her own benefit. Indeed, Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) and Ratnovski (2009) 
propose that quantity regulation is costly: a precise definition of what constitutes a liquid asset 
in the context of bank liquidity regulation is difficult. While assets that are unconditionally 
eligible for central bank repo operations may have guaranteed liquidity, they are restricted to a 
subset of high-quality government bonds. Thus, these assets are expensive to hold. Other 
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assets such as highly-rated corporate bonds may be liquid during tranquil times but their 
liquidity may dry up during market stress. Ex ante, it is therefore difficult to judge which 
assets constitute liquid assets that serve as a building block for liquidity regulation.  
Moreover, mandating banks to hold liquid assets gives rise to opportunity costs because it 
interferes with asset choices in a similar vein as do minimum reserve requirements. Slovin et 
al. (1990) show that increases in unremunerated reserve requirements reduce shareholder 
wealth. Such requirements are an excise tax on banking activities that lower future cash flows. 
While liquidity regulation does not compromise banks’ asset choices and profitability to the 
same extent as do reserve requirements, the direction of the effect is similar. In absence of 
such regulations, banks may deploy the funds to finance loans that attract higher yields than 
government bonds. Liquidity regulation, similar to reserve requirements, is therefore likely to 
reduce income and, concomitantly, bank profits.  
We also acknowledge an alternative hypothesis that predicts positive shareholder wealth 
effects. The point of departure for this view is that the new rules reduce systemic risk and 
limit contagion (Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin (2005)). By forestalling contagious failures and 
improving soundness, liquidity regulation increases the probability of survival of banks, and 
simultaneously increases charter values. Banerjee and Mio (2015) illustrate the contagion-
reducing effect of liquidity regulation. They show that tighter liquidity regulation reduces 
interconnectedness of the banking sector. Finally, share prices may respond positively due to 
convergence benefits towards a global standard of liquidity regulation. Such convergence 
benefits arise from a common standard of regulating liquidity. This is beneficial because 
Beck, Todorov, and Wagner (2013) demonstrate in the context of resolving cross-border bank 
distress that national regulators may have biased incentives to intervene into such institutions.    
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B. What Explains the Cross-Sectional Variation in Stock Price Returns? 
Beyond understanding how markets respond to liquidity regulation, we investigate 
whether bank- and country-specific characteristics amplify or mitigate the shareholder wealth 
effects. Economic intuition and prior work on liquidity risk suggest that bank-specific 
characteristics warrant further investigation. This analysis is also relevant from a policy 
perspective to enable regulators to gauge how banks are likely to respond to the new rules.  
We focus on characteristics that capture the motivation behind liquidity regulation: 
funding mismatches and funding mix. Ideally, any such analysis pays attention to the LCR 
and the NSFR, and these ratios’ components. However, the data required to compute both 
ratios are not yet disclosed in the balance sheets. To overcome this challenge, we rely on 
plausible approximations of the LCR and the NFSR using data from BankScope. 
Subsequently, we also discuss the role of charter values because holding liquidity increases 
the likelihood of preserving the bank as a going concern and preserves the value of the 
charter.  
 
1. Long-Run Funding Mix: Liability Composition 
The mix of funding sources and the extent to which banks are exposed to funding 
mismatch, reflected in the composition of the liability side of the  balance sheet, is likely to 
increase or decrease stock price reactions. The rules for liquidity regulation tighten the 
funding conditions by placing restrictions on what constitutes long-term stable funding 
sources. In particular, poorly capitalized banks as well as those relying on wholesale short-
term funds may be forced to issue equity, and move towards long-term borrowing to comply 
with the NSFR.  
15 
 
We argue that tightening funding for poorly capitalized banks may attract greater 
negative stock price reactions as these banks are more likely to suffer from an increase in 
funding costs. In contrast, institutions whose balance sheet characteristics signal that assets 
are largely supported by long-term stable funds are less pressed to adjust the asset-liability 
mix relative to banks far off the required standards. We therefore anticipate the negative 
shareholder wealth effects to be smaller in magnitude for banks with a relatively limited 
funding mismatch. This will be reflected in a higher coverage of assets financed by long-term 
funds (e.g., equity). This hypothesis matches the intuition behind the NSFR.  
 
Hypothesis 1. A higher funding mismatch has a negative impact on the price reaction to bank 
liquidity regulation.  
 
We test this hypothesis using the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO (the sum of Tier 1 capital 
plus hybrid debt and customer deposits divided by total assets) as a proxy for the NSFR.  
Because this ratio is inversely related to funding mismatch, Hypothesis 1 is consistent with a 
positive coefficient.  
 
2. Liquidity of Bank Balance Sheets: Asset Composition  
Banks whose balance sheet characteristics suggest that the volume of liquid assets can 
absorb large and sudden cash outflows are in a better position to accommodate liquidity 
requirements, and are less pressed to adjust the asset and liability mix.8 Thus, we expect the 
                                                 
8
 Ideally, an empirical proxy for the NFSR also considers asset quality in terms of risk-weights, ratings, and 
issuers. However, in a cross-country study like ours such a granular level of data is not available.  
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adverse shareholder wealth effects that we anticipate to be less pronounced for banks with 
more liquid assets. Such a hypothesis directly tests the intuition behind the LCR.   
 
Hypothesis 2. More liquid balance sheets will have a positive impact on the share price 
reaction. 
 
To test this hypothesis, we use the ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-term 
funding (LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO) as a proxy for the LCR.9  
 
3. Charter Values  
Recent work by Ratnovski (2009) establishes a link between banks’ liquidity choices and 
charter values. The basic premise is that maintaining liquidity insures the charter value. In a 
two-bank model, he shows that banks reduce liquidity if charter values are low or when banks 
expect shocks that will reduce charter value. These outcomes are due to inter-bank strategic 
complementarities with respect to liquidity choices.10 When banks expect their competitors to 
                                                 
9
 Customer funding consists of current accounts, savings accounts, and time deposits from customers. Note that 
meeting the standards of the LCR may also require banks to move towards more high quality assets. In other 
words, banks that have ex ante poor asset quality may have to adjust the asset side to comply with the LCR. We 
therefore examine the effect of a key indicator of asset quality, the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets, 
on CARs and CMARs. However, the t-statistic on this variable remains indistinguishable from zero and our 
other inferences are unaffected. The results are available from the authors.  
10
   Ratnovski (2009) focuses on crises. He shows that banks herd in equilibrium. This results in low levels of 
liquidity when they expect other banks to display suboptimal levels of liquidity. This is driven by banks’ 
anticipation of rents that arise from bailouts that distort liquidity choices. The choice trades off the preservation 
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be illiquid (e.g., during crises or when other banks suffer liquidity shocks) and bailouts are 
likely, a bank will choose high levels of illiquidity. In contrast, when other banks are liquid or 
when other banks are likely to survive liquidity shocks, banks have incentives to be liquid.  
While the two-bank model takes a banking-system perspective, Ratnovski’s (2009) work also 
translates into two bank-level predictions. First, individual banks’ liquidity levels should 
correlate positively with charter values.11 This prediction reflects that banks insure charter 
values by holding liquidity. Second, since liquidity regulation reduces the probability of 
bailouts and the associated rents, banks with higher charter values are likely to attract better 
price reactions than banks with lower charter values.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Higher charter values have positive effects on price reactions to liquidity 
regulation.  
 
Our empirical strategy relies on two alternative measures of charter values: the Market 
to-book ratio (MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO), and the ratio of customer deposits to total 
assets (CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS, a proxy for core deposits). These proxies find 
motivation in Keeley (1990) and Goyal (2005).  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
of charter values versus bailout rents. The intuition is that liquid banks have a higher probability to survive and 
realize long-term returns. In contrast, illiquid banks are likely to fail, and this attracts bailout rents.  
11
  In unreported tests, we run auxiliary regressions of the proxies for charter values 
(MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO and CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS) on the LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO. We 
find positive and significant associations, supporting Ratnovski’s (2009) intuition in his model. The results are 
available from the authors.   
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4. Two-Way Feedback Loops between Banking Sector Conditions and Sovereign Debt  
We also investigate country-specific factors to understand how they affect the market 
reaction to announcements related to the new liquidity regulation. 
The interbank market conditions between core Eurozone members and countries located at the 
periphery such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (henceforth referred to as GIIPS) 
differ considerably. Figure 1 shows these countries on a map, illustrated in dark grey. 
 
[FIGURE 1] 
These characteristics may play a role for the way equity markets respond to liquidity 
regulation. Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) suggest that this divergence of interbank 
market conditions is largely due to sovereign problems in these peripheral countries, 
reflecting two-way feedback effects from sovereign credit risk to the domestic banking 
industry and vice versa. Le Leslé (2012) also attributes differences in bank funding conditions 
between core and peripheral countries to concerns about the fragility of the economies in 
stressed Eurozone countries. To illustrate, deposit rates in interbank markets at short 
maturities below one year for core countries in the Euro area declined in line with the Euribor 
spread in the aftermath of European Central Bank’s actions in 2011 but deposit rates for banks 
located at the periphery remained around 150 basis points higher at the end of 2012. Given 
that tighter liquidity regulation implies higher cost of capital, we expect tighter interbank 
funding conditions in countries that experienced sovereign debt problems to trigger greater 
negative stock price reactions. Therefore, for countries whose banks are on average net 
lenders in the interbank market, we anticipate larger stock price reactions to liquidity 
regulation than for countries whose banks are, on average, net borrowers (and therefore have 
tighter funding conditions). 
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Hypothesis 4. Higher average interbank ratios on the country level have positive effects on the 
price reaction to liquidity regulation. 
 
Related to the previous argument is the link between a country’s fiscal position, 
government debt, and domestic interbank market conditions. Budget deficits signal that 
governments spend more than they earn per fiscal year. Unless such deficits are exclusively 
financed by minting funds, they result in increases in national debt which further undermines 
the sovereign’s creditworthiness, aggravating the adverse feedback effects between sovereign 
risk and the banks’ refinancing conditions. Importantly, the recent bailouts in the form of 
recapitalizations are closely associated with increases in government debt. For instance, Lane 
(2012) highlights that Ireland and Portugal witnessed increases in debt to gross domestic 
product (GDP) ratios during the crisis, and Acharya et al. (2014) show that increases in 
financial sector distress correlate positively with increases in the public debt to GDP ratios. 
Via the two-way feedback loop, the higher sovereign credit risk triggers further increases in 
the refinancing costs of the banking sector. For these reasons, we expect worse price reactions 
for banks domiciled in countries with high debt to GDP ratios, and in particular for those in 
the periphery countries, as they were most affected by the Eurozone crisis. 
 
 
Hypothesis 5. Greater government indebtedness has a negative effect on the price reaction to 
liquidity regulation. Being domiciled in a GIIPS country has a negative impact on the price 
reaction to liquidity regulation. 
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Finally, we hypothesize that banks headquartered in the Eurozone may display more 
negative stock price reactions than banks located elsewhere. Figure 2 highlights in dark grey 
the countries that are not members of the Eurozone.  
 [FIGURE 2] 
 
This differential effect is reflective of concerns about contagion in the Eurozone that may 
ultimately also affect the refinancing conditions in the banking sector and liquidity risk. Such 
concerns were repeatedly raised in the media, and also find support in academic work. For 
instance, the Financial Times stresses on Feb. 24, 2010 that debt levels in several Eurozone 
countries raise fears of ratings downgrades for other member countries, and the Wall Street 
Journal reports on Nov. 26, 2010 on contagion risk arising from Greece and Ireland for 
Belgium.12 Recent work by Lucas, Schwaab, and Zhang (2014) investigates default 
probabilities in nine Eurozone member countries conditional on a default of Greece. They 
show that Ireland and Portugal would be most affected by a Greek default with conditional 
probabilities of failure of approximately 30%. Other countries (e.g., Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, France, and Italy) display conditional default probabilities below 20%. 
 
Hypothesis 6. Location in a Eurozone country negatively affects the price reaction to liquidity 
regulation.13 
                                                 
12
  See Oakley (2010) Sovereigns: Debt Levels Raise Fears of Further Downgrades, Financial Times, Feb. 24, 2010, 
and Robinson (2010) Belgian Debt and Contagion. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 26, 2010.  
13
 An additional reason for expecting a negative impact of being domiciled in the Eurozone is the fact that large 
Eurozone banks may be supervised directly by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) led by the European 
Central Bank. If the SSM is considered by market participants to be a tougher supervisor that national 
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We rely on several measures to capture the role of interbank conditions, sovereign debt, 
the government’s fiscal position, and bank location. We use BankScope to compute the 
position of a bank in the interbank market by scaling money lent to other banks by the money 
borrowed from other banks. A higher interbank ratio suggests that a bank is a net placer in the 
interbank market. Next, we calculate the average of this variable, called 
INTERBANK_RATIO, for each country and each year. To gauge how the fiscal position 
affects stock prices, we retrieve the debt-to-GDP ratio (DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO) from 
World Bank Development Indicators. The effect of Eurozone membership is captured with a 
dummy, EUROZONE, that takes on the value of 1 if a country uses the Euro currency (0 
otherwise). We use a dummy variable, GIIPS, to identify banks located in any of the five 
GIIPS countries that experienced sovereign debt problems.  
 
 
 
5. Pre-Existing Domestic Liquidity Regulation  
Several countries had some form of domestic liquidity regulation in place prior to the 
announcements by the Basel Committee.  
To establish which countries had guidelines for liquidity risk in place, we first screen the 
survey by the World Bank on Banking Regulation and Supervision, using the waves for 2003, 
2007, and 2012; Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2012)). 
Using several waves ensures obtaining information about guidelines on liquidity risk prior to 
                                                                                                                                                              
supervisors this may also explain why new liquidity regulations have a relatively large negative impact on stock 
prices of banks from the Eurozone. Section IV.A highlights that many of the banks in our sample are indeed 
subject to the SSM.  
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the crisis, and we can also trace the evolution of these provisions during the sample period. 
We focus on that section in the database which contains details about guidelines for liquidity 
risk. We then verify this information by cross-checking the details with information from the 
websites of the countries’ central banks and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).14 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom had provisions in 
place that aim to bolster banks’ liquidity holdings. Figure 3 highlights these countries in dark 
grey.  
[FIGURE 3] 
The Danish rules stipulate that banks are required to have adequate liquidity, and are 
based on ratios that resemble the spirit of the LCR. Similar provisions exist for Germany. 
Since 2003, the Dutch guidelines also contain quantitative liquidity requirements that 
resemble the new proposals. Switzerland introduced quantitative liquidity requirements in 
1988, and the United Kingdom also had minimum liquidity requirements in place with the 
objective to avoid maturity mismatches. We expect shareholders of institutions headquartered 
in these countries to respond more negatively to the new rules because they are potentially 
better able than shareholders elsewhere to gauge the effect of new regulation for bank 
profitability.   
However, the effect of prior legislation may also go in the opposite direction. For banks 
that are already subject to national liquidity requirements any new liquidity requirement as 
part of Basel III may not lead to an observable reduction in bank profitability. Hence, it is also 
possible that shareholders of institutions headquartered in these countries will respond less 
                                                 
14
  See, for instance, de Haan and van den End (2012), Banerjee and Mio (2015), and 
http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Tasks/Banking_supervision/Liquidity/liquidity.html.   
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negatively to the new liquidity regulation. We therefore offer two alternative hypotheses on 
the effect of pre-existing domestic liquidity regulation: 
 
Hypothesis 7A. Being headquartered in a country with pre-existing domestic regulations on 
liquidity has a negative impact on the price reaction to liquidity regulation. 
 
Hypothesis 7B. Being headquartered in a country with pre-existing domestic regulations on 
liquidity has a positive impact on the price reaction to liquidity regulation. 
 
Our tests use a dummy, LIQUIDITY_REGULATION, that takes on the value of 1 in 
instances when a country has pre-existing domestic liquidity regulation in place (0 
otherwise).15 A negative coefficient on this dummy variable would indicate that Hypothesis 
7A is applicable, while a positive coefficient would support Hypothesis 7B. If the two effects 
offset each other, the coefficient may be insignificant. 
 
IV. Data, Representativeness, and Choice of Event Dates 
We now discuss our sample. While our empirical work only considers listed banks, 
liquidity regulation extends to all banks, irrespective of their listing. Therefore, we also 
                                                 
15
  In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) imposed capital requirements on individual 
banks which were bank-specific but not publicly announced (Aiyar, Calomiris, Hooley, Korniyenko, and 
Wieladek (2014)). In unreported tests, we remove all U.K. banks from the sample to avoid any confounding 
effects from these bank-specific capital requirements which may have coincided with the announcements about 
liquidity regulation. Our findings remain virtually unchanged; these tests are available from the authors.  
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discuss sample representativeness. Subsequently, we elaborate on the choice of our event 
dates.  
A. Data and Representativeness 
The starting point for the sample selection is the population of commercial banks and 
bank holding companies (BHCs) in the European Union (EU) and Switzerland, as reported in 
BankScope. BankScope is our source for the bank-specific variables used below to establish 
heterogeneous responses to liquidity regulation. We include Switzerland because of the vast 
size of its banking system and the linkages of Swiss banks with banks in the EU.  
BankScope contains data for 142 banks and BHCs in Europe listed on a stock exchange. 
We filter out banks without deposits to ensure that the sample banks engage in financial 
intermediation. This screen reduces the sample by 14 banks for which BankScope records 
zero deposits. We also omit seven observations for five banks due to negative common equity, 
resulting in a final sample of 128 banks and BHCs. Appendix C presents more details.  
For these banks, we retrieve daily closing prices from DataStream for the period Feb. 21, 
2007 to Jan. 7, 2013 for our event study.  
Table 2 provides an overview of the sample composition. Panel A shows the number of 
sample banks and their aggregate market share by country to illustrate the representativeness 
because these 128 banks are only a subset of the European banking system. This discussion is 
important because liquidity regulation applies to all banks in the EU and Switzerland but very 
often only the largest banks are publicly listed. The sample banks account on average for 57% 
of total banking system assets in the domestic banking systems, 57% of total loans, and for 
39% of total liabilities. In Sweden, the sample banks represent over 91% of total banking 
system assets, over 90% of total loans, and over 77% of total liabilities. The relevance of 
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these banks is also reflected in the fact that many of them are systemically important. Of the 
78 sample banks located in the Eurozone, 40 fall under the Single Supervisory Mechanism.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports means and standard deviations for the bank-and country-specific 
variables used to explain the CARs and CMARs below. Apart from the values on the 
DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO, the data refer to the period 2007–2012 to allow for the delay in the 
release of information via the annual reports. Close scrutiny of the standard deviations 
highlights considerable within-country heterogeneities for the bank-specific variables, where 
the standard deviations range from 0.02 in Malta for the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO in the 
minimum to 1.13 for the Swiss LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO in the maximum. These 
heterogeneities are most pronounced for MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO, whose standard 
deviations are between 0.29 (Finland) and 2.27 (Sweden).  
 
[TABLE 2: SAMPLE COMPOSITION, REPRESENTATIVENESS, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS] 
 
B. Event Dates 
  Our event dates refer exclusively to official announcements by the BCBS that result in 
proposed or actual changes of liquidity regulation. This choice is a restrictive, yet plausible, 
criterion. Any other news and debates regarding the introduction of liquidity regulation are 
based on and influenced by the debates within the BCBS and its representatives.  
  The selection of event dates proceeds as follows. First, we use public information from 
the BIS website to determine all events and dates leading up to the Basel III framework. We 
consider all events in the sections of the BIS website referred to as: i) the Global Regulatory 
Framework for Capital and Liquidity, comprising the entire spectrum of measures introduced 
by the BCBS through Basel II, Basel 2.5, and Basel III accords; and ii) the Basel Committee’s 
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Response to the Financial Crisis, which focuses initiatives undertaken by the BCBS since the 
2007–2009 crisis.16    
  Second, we refine the list of events by considering only those related to Basel III, and 
drop initiatives referred to Basel II, and Basel 2.5 accords. As discussed above, to establish 
the wealth effects that are causally attributable to liquidity regulation we need to be aware that 
Basel III also encompasses other types of regulation. We therefore only select events with 
proposed or actual changes in liquidity regulation, and drop events focusing on capital 
requirements only. However, some rules that address liquidity regulation have been released 
at the same time as measures on capital requirements. We consider these dates only when the 
event involves a major change in liquidity regulation. To ultimately understand the extent to 
which market reactions are driven by announcements other than those related to liquidity and 
disentangle market reactions to liquidity regulation from confounding announcements relating 
to other aspects of Basel II, we also calculate CARs and CMARs over the event dates which 
entail exclusively initiatives on liquidity (i.e., Events #1, #2, #3, and #7, i.e., the Liquidity 
only bucket).   
  Third, we conduct a media search to ascertain that the events we focus on indeed convey 
significant information to the market. This media search helps rule out anticipation effects, a 
key concern for event study analysis. To this end, we carefully search major international 
media outlets (Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Wall Street Journal Europe, International 
Herald Tribune) via LEXIS/NEXIS for a period up to one week after each of the seven event 
dates. This exercise suggests substantial international media coverage in the correspondence 
                                                 
16
  See http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/compilation.htm and http://www.bis.org/bcbs/fincriscomp.htm, respectively. 
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to all events included in our empirical tests.17  To allay concerns about anticipation effects, we 
extend this news search to a week, i.e., 5 trading days, prior to the event date.   
  Finally, we record the day of the week on which the BCBS publicly released its 
statement. For our calculation of abnormal returns across event dates, we verify that each 
announcement has been released prior to the closing times of European stock exchanges.18 
This condition ensures that the new information is available to all stock exchanges.  
 
V. Econometric Methodology  
Modeling market reactions to the announcements of the BCBS presents econometric 
challenges. The literature lacks consensus on the choice of the estimation method for 
abnormal returns. Moreover, Brown and Warner (1980) stress that short event-window 
models based on estimation of the security’s beta (such as the market model or the CAPM) do 
not lead to significantly more precise estimates for the abnormal returns. For these reasons, 
we estimate both abnormal returns (AR) and market-adjusted returns (MAR) for the event 
window (–1,1), followed by calculation of the CARs and CMARs for each event (Focarelli, 
Pozzolo, and Casolaro (2008)).  
                                                 
17 
 We employ a variety of keyword searches to assess the international press coverage of the Basel Committee’s 
initiatives included in our analysis. In particular, we use the following keywords: bank liquidity, liquidity 
proposals, Basel Committee, BIS, Bank for International Settlements, liquidity risk, Basel 3, Basel III, bank 
supervisors, bank supervision, and liquidity management. 
18
  When the hour of the press release is unavailable we screen the international press to check whether any 
European bank stock reaction is reported, on the date of the event, in response to the Basel Committee’s 
announcement.   
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We estimate the AR using the market model extended to include day-of-the-week 
dummies (Kaplanski and Levy (2010)):  
   (1)                                           ARi,t = Ri,t – (αi + βi Rm,t +∑
=
5
2d
dd Dλ ), 
where 
Dd = 1  if d = 2 for Tuesdays, d = 3 for Wednesdays, d = 4 for Thursdays, and d = 5 for 
Fridays, and Dd = 0 otherwise. 
Consistent with prior work (e.g., Armour, Mayer, and Polo (forthcoming)), we employ an 
estimation window of 260 trading days (–261,–2) for the market model. Because we consider 
a long sample period, using different estimation windows for each event instead of only one 
estimation window for all events allows for potential parameter instability over time. We also 
adjust for first-order autocorrelation in the error term of the market model regression using the 
Prais-Winsten method (Allen and Wilhelm (1988)).  
We compute the market-adjusted return (MAR) as the difference between the log return 
of the security (Ri,t) and the log return of the proxy for the market portfolio (Rm,t) 
 
(2)                                                    MARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t , 
 
The literature highlights that the MAR is free of bias resulting from significant events in 
the estimation period, which undermines estimation of the beta (Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller (2002)). Since our sample period covers part of the 2007–2009 financial crisis 
and the Eurozone crisis, it is likely that significant events affected estimation of the beta.  
We then compute the corresponding CAR and CMAR for the 3-day event window (−1, 
1). Focusing on short event windows is particularly useful for the purpose of this study 
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because this restrictive criterion reduces the impact of potentially confounding events. Their 
influence typically increases as the event window widens. 
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For our regressions we rely on 3-day event windows, where t1 is the trading day before 
the event and t2 the trading day after the event. 
We adopt the MSCI World and the MSCI Europe as proxies for the market portfolio. 
These proxies, especially the first one, are less subject to bias than national indices because of 
potential effects of liquidity regulation on the stock prices of non-financial firms of a country.  
The first step of our analysis focuses on the market-wide reaction to liquidity regulation using 
equal-weighted and market-weighted portfolios of the bank stocks in our sample. We compute 
the aggregate effect of the regulation by considering the average CARs and CMARs over all 
seven events, followed by tests for the four Liquidity only events that back out the effects of 
other aspects of Basel III.  
To correctly gauge the market reaction to stricter liquidity rules even though Events #5 
and #7 (see Table 1) are associated with loosening of the initial proposals, we follow the 
standard approach in the literature pioneered by Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, and Riedl 
(2010), and multiply the corresponding CAR or CMAR by minus one for these two events. 
For example, a positive price reaction for Events #5 and #7 suggests that bank shareholders 
benefit from looser liquidity requirements, and therefore it would not make sense to sum the 
raw CARs or CMARs for these events to the CARs and CMARs for the other five events. 
   (3) 
   (4) 
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After multiplying the CARs and CMARs for these events by minus one, the sum of CARs and 
CMARs for all events measures the market reaction to stricter liquidity rules appropriately. 
Because we have only seven and four events for the total effects and the Liquidity only events, 
calculating the significance of the CARs and CMARs based on the assumption of Normality 
may lead to unreliable t-statistics. For this reason, we rely on bootstrap simulations to evaluate 
the significance of the cumulative effect of all seven events and the effect of the four Liquidity 
only events, similar to Armstrong et al. (2010).  
The bootstrap simulations are performed as follows: we exclude days which fall in the 3-
day window for the seven events to consider only non-event trading days. Next, we randomly 
choose seven (or four, for the results pertaining to the Liquidity only bucket) non-overlapping 
placebo events for the period Feb. 1, 2008 to Feb. 28, 2013. This step is repeated 800 times. 
Finally, we compute the sum of the CAR and CMAR over all seven (and four) events for each 
of the 800 samples of placebo events. These steps ensure that the simulated data represent the 
distribution of CAR and CMAR under the null hypothesis because they are estimated for non-
event trading days (for which announcements related to liquidity regulation did not occur). 
The p-values are computed on the basis of the number of cases for which the CAR or CMAR 
is larger or smaller than the estimated value based on 2-tail tests.  
For the second stage of our analysis, we run regressions of the CARs and CMARs on both a 
vector of bank-level (Bi,t) and a vector of country-level (Ci,t) characteristics:19 
 
                                                 
19
  Investigating the cross-sectional determinants of CARs using such a two-stage approach is common in banking. 
Focarelli et al. (2008) employ a similar methodology to examine how the share of the arranger of syndicated 
loans (as well as characteristics related to the syndicate structure, the credit facility and the borrower) affect the 
share price reaction of the borrower. 
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(5)             ,CAR
,, titi cba ε+++= ti,ti, BC  
(6)                .CMAR
,, titi fed η+++= ti,ti, BC  
The vector Bi,t consists of the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO, LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO, 
CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS, and MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO. The vector Ci,t 
comprises DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO, the dummy variables EUROZONE, GIIPS, and 
LIQUIDITY_REGULATION, and the INTERBANK_RATIO.20 We winsorize all bank-level 
explanatory variables at the 1st and 99th percentile, as well as the CARs and CMARs 
(Armour et al. (forthcoming)). Because some of the variables are time-invariant, such as 
GIIPS or EUROZONE, we estimate all the regressions using a random effects model with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on the country-level.  
 
VI. Results 
We first provide a visual inspection of the behavior of CARs and CMARs around the 
event date, and then present the empirical analysis for the market reactions. Subsequently, we 
show tests that relate bank-specific and country-specific characteristics to the CARs and 
CMARs.  
 
 
 
                                                 
20
  All coefficients in the tables on the cross-sectional regressions should be read as follows: A negative coefficient 
signals that an increase in variable Bi,t generates a decrease in the CAR/CMAR (i.e., if the CAR/CMAR is 
negative, this amplifies the reduction). A positive coefficient signals that an increase in variable Bi,t generates an 
increase in the CAR/CMAR (i.e., if the CAR/CMAR is negative, this mitigates the reduction and potentially 
leads to a positive CAR/CMAR). 
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A. Market Reaction to Bank Liquidity Regulation: Aggregate and Individual Effects 
Graphs A–D in Figure 4 illustrate the behavior of equal-weighted and market-weighted 
CARs and CMARs around a 3-day event window centred on the announcement date 
(represented with a vertical solid bold line). The solid line represents CARs (Graphs A and B) 
or CMARs (Graphs C and D) estimated using the MSCI World as a proxy for the market 
portfolio, while the dashed line represents CARs (Graphs A and B) or CMARs (Graphs C and 
D) estimated using the MSCI Europe as a proxy for the market portfolio. Graphs A and C use 
a market-weighted portfolio of banks, while Graphs B and D use an equal-weighted portfolio 
of the bank stocks in our sample. The four graphs consistently indicate declines in CARs and 
CMARs around the announcement dates. A slight decline on the day prior to the 
announcements suggests that there may have been information leakages, this supports our 
choice to focus on the event window (–1,1). 
 
[FIGURE 4] 
 
 
 
 
1. Aggregate Effects 
Table 3 presents our first set of analyses. We compute the total and the average effect for 
all seven events. Table 3 reproduces the findings for both equal-weighted and market-
weighted portfolios. We also present bootstrapped p-values for the average CAR or CMAR, 
based on 800 bootstrap simulations for the period Feb. 1, 2008–Feb. 28, 2013, as discussed 
above. Importantly, we also present the results for the Liquidity only bucket based on 
randomly selected trading days. The latter setup is the most rigorous way of establishing the 
causal effects of liquidity regulation on bank stock prices.  
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Panel A of Table 3 uses the MSCI World as a proxy for the market index, and Panel B 
relies on the MSCI Europe. Panel A points towards negative wealth effects arising from the 
announcements. The t-statistics for the total effect are statistically significant in three cases 
out of four. The average CAR(–1,1) and CMAR(–1,1) ranges between –0.0095 and –0.0221, 
and the price reaction is stronger for the market-weighted portfolios (with a CAR of –0.0188 
and a CMAR –0.0221) than for the equal-weighted portfolio (–0.0099 and –0.0095), 
suggesting that bigger banks react more negatively to the regulation than smaller banks. Panel 
B shows that using the MSCI Europe yields very similar inferences. The t-statistics are 
significant in three out of four cases for the total effect. Likewise, the average CAR and 
CMAR considering all seven events is larger in magnitude for the market-weighted portfolio 
(–0.0143 and –0.0159) than for the equal-weighted portfolio (–0.0075 and –0.0033).   
The economic magnitude of these aggregate effects appears sizeable. Considering the 
sum of the CAR(–1,1) for all seven events for the market-weighted portfolios, the overall loss 
in market capitalization amounts to a staggering 354 million Euros in Panel A (equivalent to a 
reduction in market capitalization for all listed banks in Europe by –6.95%), and 269 million 
Euros in Panel B (a decline in market capitalization by –5.27%).  
 
2. Individual Effects 
Clearly, we focus on the aggregate effect of announcements concerning liquidity 
regulation. For completeness, however, we also briefly discuss the market reactions to the 
seven individual announcements. These tests are useful to establish if the market responses 
are consistent with the hypothesised direction of the effects in terms of tightening or loosening 
of the initial proposals concerning liquidity regulation. To preserve space, these tests are 
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relegated to Table A.1 in our Internet Appendix (available at www.jfqa.org) which reports the 
CARs and CMARs.  
Three observations stand out. First, several of the individual announcements attract 
negative market reactions. This is consistent with both the visual inspection of the data and 
the aggregate effect documented so far. Second, consistent with our expectations, Events #5 
and #7 result in positive stock price reactions due to the loosening of the initial proposals 
(consistent with Table 3, we multiply these CARs and CMARs by minus one in Table A.1). 
Third, the largest price reaction is for Event #7 which is the final and definitive announcement 
for the LCR which again relaxed previously proposed liquidity rules. The magnitude of the 
market reaction suggests that the extent of the relaxation surprised the market more than the 
previous announcements.  
 
3. Liquidity only Bucket  
However, these tests still leave open the possibility that confounding announcements 
from the BCBS on capital regulation or any other component of Basel III drive the results. 
Concluding that liquidity regulation causally drives reductions in market capitalization would 
be inappropriate. Indeed, our inspection of the tests based on the Liquidity only bucket 
highlights that the t-statistics are only weakly significant or insignificant when we back out 
confounding effects. In line with the decline of statistical significance, the economic 
magnitude of the adverse price movements is less pronounced. The loss related to the events 
1, 2, 3, and 7 amounts to 206 million Euros in Panel A, and 154 million Euros in Panel B. 
Which factors are behind these weaker inferences? First, the findings for the Liquidity 
only bucket are likely to due to a loss of power of the tests when only four events are 
considered. Second, the events we exclude from the Liquidity only bucket are important for 
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market participants in the sense that these announcements received extensive media coverage 
because they cover not only liquidity regulation but also other characteristics of Basel III.21 
The decline both in terms of statistical significance and in terms of economic magnitude is 
therefore not surprising. Liquidity regulation is only one component of the revised Basel 
framework. The findings for the Liquidity only bucket are therefore bound to be weaker. 
Third, and most importantly, the revisions and the lobbying by the industry to mitigate the 
effects of tight liquidity regulation suggests that markets did not consider the new rules to be 
binding at the time of the announcement. The successful lobbying fuelled expectations about 
further modifications (Santos and Elliott (2012)). For instance, the LCR has been amended 
twice since its initial proposal, to eventually allow additional, less liquid instruments to be 
considered as high quality liquid assets (Fullenkamp and Rochon (2016)). This is 
consequently reflected in limited effects for bank valuation. 
[TABLE 3: AGGREGATE STOCK MARKET REACTION] 
 
4. Placebo Tests 
Table 3 also contains tests based on placebo events that assume the events considering 
the CARs and CMARs occur five trading days prior to the each one of the actual events. 
These tests help understand whether the results are driven by a downward trend in returns of 
bank stocks relative to the market in the days surrounding the events. Moreover, these 
analyses also allow ruling out anticipation effects that may have occurred prior to the event 
windows. 
                                                 
21
  A representative news item in the Financial Times on July 27, 2010 reads “Global banking regulators reached a 
breakthrough agreement yesterday to tighten capital requirements and impose new worldwide liquidity and 
leverage standards, but softened some of their proposals and delayed others until at least 2018.” 
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Irrespective of the choice of the proxy for the market portfolio, all placebo events in 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 remain insignificant at the 5% level. These tests suggest the 
absence of anticipation effects and alleviate the concern that the significance of the results for 
the actual events is due to short-run trends in the CARs and CMARs.  
B. Country- and Bank-Specific Characteristics and Stock Price Reactions 
 
Table 4 shows how bank- and country-specific variables correlate with the stock price 
reactions. We again present results with both the MSCI World (Panel A), and the MSCI 
Europe (Panel B) index as a proxy for the market portfolio. 
 
[TABLE 4: BANK- AND COUNTRY-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS] 
Importantly, these tests demonstrate that bank-specific variables explain much of the 
variation in CARs and CMARs. Our analysis that focuses on the intuition behind the LCR 
using the LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO as a proxy for the LCR supports the idea that banks 
with liquid balance sheets display positive CARs with t-statistics between 3.494 and 4.268. 
The proxy for the NFSR, the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO, enters the regressions with a 
negative sign.22 This result empirically refutes Hypothesis 1. The pecking order theory 
provides a plausible explanation for this result. Myers and Majluf (1984) posit that issuing 
equity is expensive, a prediction that finds ample support in empirical work (e.g., Cornett and 
Tehranian (1994)). As the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO is considerably influenced by Tier 1 
capital, which increases banks’ weighted average cost of capital (Baker and Wurgler (2015)), 
well capitalised banks may react negatively to the new standards because they are likely to be 
                                                 
22
 We obtain qualitatively very similar results when we substitute the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO with the Tier 1 
capital ratio. These tests are available from the authors.  
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more resilient to liquidity shocks.23 Thus, they may be less willing to bear the additional costs 
of adjusting their asset/liability composition to comply with the new standards. 
Shareholders of banks with more high quality capital seem to view liquidity regulation as 
particularly onerous and undesirable. To verify this statement empirically, we use an 
interaction between a CORE_FUNDING_RATIO_DUMMY (which takes on the value of 1 if 
the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO is above the 75th percentile, 0 otherwise) and our proxy for 
the LCR, the LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO. In line with our interpretation, this interaction term 
enters significantly negatively, suggesting that banks with a large stable funding base are less 
exposed to liquidity shocks that may arise from a sudden dry ups of short-term funds. 
Therefore, those banks are also less pressed to maintain large liquidity holdings to buffer such 
a shock. 
The magnitude of the effect is considerable. The values from the second column in Table 
4 for the coefficient on the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO indicate that moving from the 
sample's 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of the distribution of the 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO is associated with a decline in the (–1,1) CAR of 1.98% and 
2.15% for the models using the MSCI World and the MSCI Europe, respectively. The effects 
for the ratio of CUST_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS suggest increases in the (–1,1) CAR of 
2.88% for the MSCI World (2.91% for the MSCI Europe). For the 
LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO these values are 0.35% for the MSCI World, and 0.38% for the 
MSCI Europe. These results suggest that regulation on the LCR (as proxied by the 
LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO) has had a relatively smaller impact on bank share prices than 
regulation on the NSFR (as proxied by the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO). A plausible 
                                                 
23
 The correlation between the Tier 1 capital ratio and the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO is 0.59.  
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interpretation for this result is that the regulation on LCR was severely dampened over time 
(especially in association with Event #7).  
We find some support for the hypothesis that charter values matter. While the coefficients 
on MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO remain insignificant, the coefficients on the ratio of 
Customer deposits to total assets are positive and significant, consistent with Hypothesis 3.   
Next, we discuss country-level characteristics. Location at the periphery, approximated 
by the GIIPS dummy variable, and Eurozone membership do not affect the CARs or 
CMARs.24 However, pre-existing domestic liquidity regulation, government indebtedness, 
and the interbank market conditions play a role. The INTERBANK_RATIO is significantly 
positively related to the CARs and CMARs, suggesting that being domiciled in a country with 
                                                 
24
 It may be argued that banks located in highly-indebted countries, the GIIPS, may not be able to use their 
governments' debts as collateral to borrow from the European Central Bank at all, or only with large haircuts, to 
obtain the liquidity they need to satisfy liquidity requirements. To address this, we run our baseline regressions 
again after replacing the dummy variable GIIPS with GIIPS\timesGovernment bonds, where Government bonds 
is the ratio of government bonds to total assets. As explained by Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014), while 
BankScope does not provide a breakdown of government bonds by nationality, more than 75% of banks’ 
bondholdings correspond to domestic bonds. Therefore, the interaction between GIIPS and 
GOVERNMENT_BONDS captures the effect of holding a large portion of assets in bonds issued by GIIPS 
countries. The coefficients on GIIPS × GOVERNMENT_BONDS are large and significantly negative. Results 
are available from the authors. In unreported tests, we also examine if Eurozone banks are more strongly affected 
during the Eurozone crisis to further examine the two-way feedback loop. We use an interaction term between 
EUROZONE and a dummy for CRISIS years that takes on the value of one in the years from 2010 onwards. The 
magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction term is larger than for the EUROZONE dummy in the main 
specification, reinforcing the view that the nexus between banking conditions and sovereign debt amplifies the 
stock price reactions.  
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tighter funding conditions in the interbank market decreases the CARs and CMARs. This 
result is consistent with Hypothesis 4. There is also some evidence of negative effects from 
pre-existing domestic liquidity regulation which supports Hypothesis 7A. The coefficients 
indicate that shareholders of banks in countries that already had some form of liquidity 
regulation in place experience more negative wealth effects. The fact that bank-specific 
variables are more robustly associated than country-level variables with abnormal returns is 
not surprising. Bank-level characteristics are likely to play a greater role for the cross-
sectional variation in stock price returns than country-level characteristics.  
[TABLE 5: COUNTRY AND BANK-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS AND CARs –  
LIQUIDITY ONLY BUCKET] 
Liquidity only Bucket  
Table 5 replicates these regressions but excludes the Events #4, #5, and #6 to focus on the 
Liquidity only bucket. Our findings are similar. 
 
C. Further Robustness and Falsification Tests 
A potential concern using event study methodology is that the news released by the 
BCBS coincide with bank-specific events such as earnings announcements, ratings 
downgrades, and changes in corporate governance structures which also affect share prices. 
To rule out such concerns, we screen the international press via LEXIS/NEXIS and use the 
following keywords: dividends, earnings, CEO, losses, write-downs, restatement, downgrade, 
rating, fraud, annual report, manipulate, inspection, restructuring, M&A, merger, acquisition, 
stock split, dilution, fired, restructuring, issue, takeover. We then replicate the regressions 
from Tables 4 and 5 but exclude banks for which our news search suggests the presence of 
confounding events over a 3-day window, centred on the event day. Our findings remain 
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unchanged. These tests are relegated to the Internet Appendix, Tables A.2 and A.3. 
While our main tests already correct for heteroskedasticity, equation (1) may not 
sufficiently capture the impact of volatility changes on the standard errors. The phenomenon 
that volatility tends to cluster can undermine the assumption of constant variance. If volatility 
increases around the announcement days we study and we ignore such volatility clustering, 
we may unintentionally over-reject the null hypothesis (Boehmer (1991)). To address this 
issue, Internet Appendix, Table A.4, shows tests based on GARCH modelling.25 Our 
inferences remain unchanged when all seven events are considered. Likewise, the results for 
the cross-sectional determinants of the CARs and CMARs remain unaltered when we exclude 
the announcements associated with a negative effect on the probability to impose stricter 
liquidity rules (i.e., Event #5 and #7).  
 
Falsification Tests 
Prior to offering some concluding remarks, we embark upon a falsification exercise. This 
analysis raises the question of whether the effects we capture are limited to bank stocks.  
 
We run the tests from Table 3 but use the national indices (see Appendix D) instead of 
the portfolios of bank stocks to calculate CARs and CMARs. The idea is to analyze whether 
other firms, i.e., non-financial corporations, are affected by the announcements by the BCBS. 
                                                 
25
  We estimate the market model similar to equation (1), but according to an AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model instead of 
a Prais-Winsten model. The conditional mean equation is estimated as follows:  
Ri,t = αi + βi Rm,t + ρ Ri,t-1 +∑
=
5
2d
dd Dλ + εi,t. 
The conditional variance equation is estimated according to:  
hi,t = γ0 + γ1(εi,t−1)2+ γ2hi,t-−1. 
The daily abnormal returns are the residuals of the conditional mean equation. 
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The results are shown in Table A.5 of the Internet Appendix. Out of 18 tests in Panel A that 
focus on CARs, only the analyses for Belgium, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom enter 
weakly significantly, all other tests remain insignificant. Focusing on the Liquidity only 
bucket further strengthens these inferences: we only find significant effects for the United 
Kingdom. Panel B reports on CMARs. We only find one significant association for the full 
sample (Luxembourg), and one for the Liquidity only bucket (United Kingdom). Thus, for 
most of the countries in the sample, we can rule out any simultaneous effects for other listed 
companies arising from liquidity regulation.  
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we use event study methodology to present the first analysis of the effect of 
bank liquidity regulation, a major innovation of the Basel III framework, on bank stock prices. 
Central to this landmark event in banking regulation are two new ratios that address liquidity 
risk, the NSFR and the LCR. 
The regulatory process leading to the introduction of liquidity regulation consists of 
seven separate but related announcements by the BCBS.  Over a time horizon of 
approximately five years, the BCBS made several amendments and revisions to the initial 
proposal in response to comments received by the banking industry. We exploit this gradual 
release of new information about details of the new regulation to establish the effects on 
shareholder wealth in terms of CARs and CMARs for listed banks in Europe.   
While proponents of liquidity regulation place great emphasis on pointing out the role of 
global liquidity standards for banking system soundness, the controversial debate and 
criticism highlighted by the banking industry in the run-up to the implementation of the new 
rules suggests that regulating liquidity is considered to be costly.  
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Our first set of results indeed suggests that market participants respond negatively to 
announcements about bank liquidity regulation. This finding is consistent with the view that 
complying with liquidity regulations interferes with banks’ asset and liability choices and 
ultimately reduces profits. However, further tests that separate out stock price reactions to 
liquidity regulation from responses to announcements to capital regulation and other aspects 
of Basel III which occur at the same time and are contained in the same press release, weaken 
these inferences and the average stock price reaction is at best weakly significant. Two 
reasons may be responsible for the weaker inferences: First, the long time horizon until the 
rules are fully enforced may have led markets to believe that the new regulation is not (yet) 
binding, and therefore only of marginal value relevance at the timing of the press release. This 
may be further amplified by the challenges posed by any new regulation: banks can only 
gradually build the competencies and procedures to comply with the rules and may not yet 
fully comprehend the ramifications that arise from liquidity regulation. Second, and more 
importantly, while liquidity regulation is likely to gradually become an important tool of the 
regulatory framework, capital regulation currently remains the dominant component of Basel 
II, both in terms of what is considered by markets to be binding and in terms of value 
relevance. What our tests for the Liquidity only bucket indicate is that liquidity regulation 
currently has some, yet limited potential to affect bank conduct above and beyond capital 
regulation. Therefore, these findings can be viewed to constitute suggestive evidence that 
regulating bank liquidity is a complement to capital regulation. 
In addition, our data support the view on regulation according to which not all regulated 
firms are equally affected. Bank-specific characteristics such as the liquidity of balance sheets 
and the exposure to funding mismatch decrease negative stock price reactions. We also find 
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some support for theories about the role of charter values which posit that holding liquidity 
insures charter values. Country-specific characteristics also play some role. The two-way 
feedback loop between the domestic banking industry and the sovereign’s creditworthiness 
affects shareholder wealth effects. High government indebtedness and strained funding 
conditions in the domestic interbank market reinforce each other, and banks from countries 
with these characteristics display bigger share price reactions than elsewhere in Europe. The 
cumulative abnormal returns are lower in countries if banks were subject to domestic liquidity 
regulation that was in place prior to the announcements by the BCBS.  
Clearly, our initial exploration of the market reaction towards the introduction of quantity 
regulation of bank liquidity can only be viewed as a starting point for a more comprehensive 
research agenda that explores the effects of liquidity regulation. Ultimately, more work is 
required to better understand how the new rules will affect bank conduct, and asset and 
liability composition. Additional work is also needed to establish how the new rules affect the 
soundness of individual banks and the financial system on the whole. We leave these 
questions for future research.    
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Appendix A. The Liquidity Standards 
The liquidity coverage ratio aims to ensure that a bank has an adequate stock of unencumbered 
high quality liquid assets which consists of cash or assets that can be converted into cash at little or no 
loss of value in private markets to meet its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar-day liquidity stress 
scenario: 
LCR =
Stock	of	HQLA	
Total	Net	Cash	Outflows	over	the	Next	30	Calendar	Days
≥ 100% 
As in its final version (Jan. 7, 2013), in order to qualify as HQLA (the numerator of the ratio), 
assets should be liquid in markets during a time of stress and, in most cases, be eligible for use in 
central bank operations. HQLA are comprised of Level 1 and Level 2 assets. Level 2 are subject to 
limits and a range of haircuts conditional on their market liquidity.  
The denominator of the LCR is the total net cash outflows, i.e. total expected cash outflows, 
minus total expected cash inflows. Expected cash outflows (inflows) are calculated by multiplying the 
outstanding balances of various categories or types of liabilities and off-balance sheet commitments 
with the rates at which they are expected to run off or be drawn down.26 Banks are expected to meet 
this requirement on an on-going basis. However, during a period of financial stress, banks are allowed 
to use their stock of HQLA, thereby falling below 100%.27 The standard was introduced on Jan. 1, 
2015, but a gradual approach will be followed as the minimum requirement will be initially set at 60% 
in order to rise in equal annual steps to reach 100% on Jan. 1, 2019, as reported below: 
 
 
                                                 
26
  Total cash inflows are subject to an aggregate cap of 75% of total expected cash outflows, thereby ensuring a 
minimum level of HQLA holdings at all times. 
27
  Nonetheless, the LCR standard is intended as a minimum level of liquidity for internationally active banks; 
national authorities may require higher minimum level of liquidity, especially if they deem that the LCR does not 
adequately reflect the liquidity risks that supervised banks face. 
50 
 
Jan. 1, 2015 Jan. 1, 2016 Jan. 1, 2017 Jan. 1, 2018 Jan. 1, 2019 
Minimum LCR = 
60% 
Minimum LCR = 
70% 
Minimum LCR = 
80% 
Minimum LCR = 
90% 
Minimum LCR = 
100% 
 
The net stable funding ratio (NSFR) establishes a minimum acceptable amount of stable 
funding based on the liquidity characteristics of an institution’s assets and activities over a one 
year horizon. The NSFR aims to limit over-reliance on wholesale funding during times of 
buoyant market liquidity and encourage better assessment of liquidity risk across all on- and 
off-balance sheet items. In addition, the NSFR approach would help to counterbalance 
incentives for institutions to fund their stock of liquid assets with short-term funds that mature 
just outside the supervisory defined horizon for that metric. The standard is expressed as the 
ratio: 
NSFR =
Available	Amount	of	Stable	Funding	
Required	Amount	of	Stable	Funding
≥ 100% 
As for the numerator, “Stable Funding” are those types and amounts of equity and 
liability financing expected to be reliable sources of funds over a one-year time horizon under 
conditions of extended stress. The amount of such funding required for a specific institution 
(the denominator of the ratio) is a function of the liquidity characteristics of various types of 
assets, off-balance sheet contingent exposures, and/or the activities pursued by the institution. 
Liabilities and assets are weighted according to their stability and liquidity characteristics, 
respectively. The standard will be introduced by Jan. 1, 2018. 
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Appendix B. Event Descriptions 
Event  Description 
1 (Feb. 21, 2008) The BCBS releases a document entitled Liquidity Risk: Management and Supervisory 
Challenges. It summarizes the key findings of a study carried out by the Working Group 
on Liquidity and aimed to review banks’ liquidity risk management strategies as well as 
liquidity supervision practices in member countries. 
 
2 (June 17, 2008) The BCBS issues for public comment the document on enhanced global Principles for 
Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision. This guidance discusses the key 
elements of a robust framework for liquidity risk management. Such elements include: 
board and senior management oversight; the establishment of policies and risk tolerance; 
the use of liquidity risk management tools such as comprehensive cash flow forecasting, 
limits and liquidity scenario stress testing; the development of robust and multifaceted 
contingency funding plans; and the maintenance of a sufficient cushion of high quality 
liquid assets to meet contingent liquidity needs. 
 
3 (Sept. 25, 2008) Global bank supervisors endorse strengthened sound practice standards for liquidity risk 
management and supervision. The final document on Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management is released. 
 
4 (Dec. 17, 2009) The BCBS issues for consultation a package of proposals to strengthen global capital and 
liquidity regulations with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector. As far as 
bank liquidity is concerned, the International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring (consultative document) is released. The 
document introduces two internationally consistent liquidity standards (the LCR and 
NSFR). It also comprises a set of common metrics that should be considered as the 
minimum types of information which supervisors should use in monitoring the liquidity 
risk profiles of supervised entities. The proposed set of monitoring tools refers in 
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particular to: contractual maturity mismatch; concentration of funding; available 
unencumbered assets; market-related monitoring tools. 
 
5 (July 26, 2010) The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS), the oversight body of the 
BCBS, meets to review the BCBS capital and liquidity reform package. Main revisions 
on the liquidity rules deal with: i) LCR: relaxing the definition of qualifying liquid assets 
(e.g., by including high quality corporate bonds and covered bonds) and introducing a 
more favourable treatment of certain liabilities (e.g., a lower run-off rate floor for retail 
and small-medium-enterprise (SME) deposits); ii) NSFR: a more favourable treatment of 
the retail business (e.g., by increasing the available stable funding factor for retail and 
SME deposits and lowering the required stable funding ratio for residential mortgages). 
However, at this stage the BCBS states that both standards require further observation 
and a number of adjustments. As for the LCR examples of measures to be refined include 
the development of standards for jurisdictions which do not have sufficient Level 1 assets 
to meet the standard; the introduction of a percentage factor to measure cash inflows; a 
clearer definition of operational activities with financial institution counterparties (e.g., 
custody, clearing and settlement, cash management activities). The BCBS declares that 
the NSFR requires an “observation phase” to address any unintended consequences 
across business models or funding structures before finalising and introducing the revised 
NSFR as a minimum standard by Jan. 1, 2018. 
 
6 (Dec. 16, 2010) The BCBS issues the Basel III rules text, presenting the details of global regulatory 
standards on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the GHOS and endorsed by 
the G20 Leaders at their November summit in Seoul. The BCBS also publishes the 
results of its comprehensive quantitative impact study. In particular, the final version of 
the document Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, 
Standards and Monitoring is released. The document incorporates and refines 
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amendments announced in broad terms in July 2010. No substantial changes have been 
made to the NSFR. 
 
7 (Jan. 7, 2013) The BCBS issues the full text of the document Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
and Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools following endorsement on Jan. 6, 2013 by the 
GHOS. The revisions to the LCR developed and agreed by the BCBS over the past two 
years include an expansion in the range of assets eligible as HQLA and some refinements 
to the assumed inflow and outflow rates to better reflect actual experience in times of 
stress.  
The main measures are summarized as follows:  
i) the expansion of the list of HQLA by the introduction of Level 2B assets (subject to 
higher haircuts and a limit of 15% of total HQLA), including corporate debt securities 
rated A+ to BBB– and certain unencumbered equities (both subject to a 50% haircut), 
certain residential mortgage-backed securities rated AA or higher (with a 25% haircut); 
ii) a more favourable treatment of: insured deposits, by a lower outflow on certain types 
of fully insured retail deposits (from 5% to 3%); of fully insured non-operational deposits 
from non-financial corporates, sovereigns, central banks and public sector entities (from 
40% to 20%), “non-operational” deposits provided by non-financial corporates, 
sovereigns, central banks, and public sector entities (from 75% to 40% );  
iii) a more favourable treatment of committed liquidity facilities to non-financial 
corporates with the reduction of the drawdown rate on the unused portion of committed 
liquidity facilities to non-financial corporates, sovereigns central banks, and public sector 
entities (from 100% to 30%). Similarly, a better treatment has been applied to interbank 
credit and liquidity facilities (distinguished from inter-financial credit facilities), in order 
to reduce the outflow rate on the former from 100% to 40%;  
iv) a better treatment of central bank operations by reducing the outflow rate on maturing 
secured funding transactions with central banks from 25% to 0%; trade finance, including 
guidance to indicate that a low outflow rate (0%–5%) is expected to apply; 
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v) a new and standardized treatment for derivatives positions, comprising additional 
derivatives risks included in the LCR with a 100% outflow (relates to collateral 
substitution, and excess collateral that the bank is contractually obligated to 
return/provide if required by a counterparty); a standardised approach for liquidity risk 
related to market value changes in derivatives positions;  net outflow of 0% for 
derivatives (and commitments) that are contractually secured/collateralised by HQLA.  
In addition, the BCBS has agreed a revised timetable to phase in the standard and to give 
effect to the BCBS intention for the stock of liquid assets to be used.  
  
Appendix C. Banks without Deposits or with Negative Equity for One or More Years. 
Ageas SA/NV, Alpha Bank AE, Azimut Holding SpA, Bankia SA, Brewin Dolphin Holdings 
Plc, Eurobank Ergasias SA, Exor Spa, Groupe Bruxelles Lambert, Institut Régional de 
Dévelopement de la Région Nord Pas-de-Calais-I.R.D. Nord Pas-de-Calais, Marfin 
Investment Group, National Bank of Greece SA, Paragon Group of Companies Plc, Pargesa 
Holding SA, Piraeus Bank SA, Robeco NV, Sampo Plc, SOFIBUS Patrimoine, Swiss Life 
Holding, Tekfen Holding AS, Cofitem – Cofimur. 
 
Appendix D. National Market Indices. 
Italy:  FTSE MIB INDEX - PRICE INDEX 
Germany:  CDAX GENERAL 'KURS' - PRICE INDEX 
Greece:  DJGL GREECE DJTM GREECE - PRICE INDEX 
Portugal:  PORTUGAL-DS Market - PRICE INDEX 
Spain:  IBEX 35 - PRICE INDEX 
Ireland:  IRELAND SE OVERALL (ISEQ) - PRICE INDEX 
United Kingdom:  FTSE 250 - PRICE INDEX 
Switzerland:  FTSE SWITZERLAND - PRICE INDEX 
France:  FRANCE CAC 40 - PRICE INDEX 
Sweden:  OMX STOCKHOLM 30 (OMXS30) - PRICE INDEX 
Belgium:  BEL ALL SHARE - PRICE INDEX 
Austria:  DJGL AUSTRIA DJTM AUSTRIA - PRICE INDEX 
Cyprus:  CYPRUS GENERAL - PRICE INDEX 
Denmark:  OMX COPENHAGEN (OMXC20) - PRICE INDEX 
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Finland:  OMX HELSINKI (OMXH) - PRICE INDEX 
Luxembourg:  LUXEMBOURG SE GENERAL - PRICE INDEX 
Malta:  MALTA SE MSE - PRICE INDEX 
Netherlands:  AEX ALL SHARE - PRICE INDEX 
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TABLE 1 
Events and Predicted Effects on Probability of Stricter Rules after Each Event 
Table 1 shows the event dates, and we also provide a brief description for each event. The 
final column gives an overview about whether the event increased or decreased the 
probability to introduce stricter rules for liquidity regulation.  
Event Date Short Description 
Probability to Introduce 
Stricter Rules 
Expected Effect on 
Bank Stock Prices 
Feb. 21, 2008 
 
Release of Liquidity Risk: 
Management and Supervisory 
Challenge 
Increased Negative 
June 17, 2008 
 
Release of Principles for 
Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision 
Increased Negative 
Sept. 25, 2008 Release of Principles for 
Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision  
Increased Negative 
Dec. 17, 2009 
 
Release of International 
Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring 
Increased Negative 
July 26, 2010 
 
Release of the July 2010 
Annex, containing the key 
broad agreements of the 
Governors and Heads of 
Supervision 
Decreased Positive 
Dec. 16, 2010 
 
Release of Basel III: 
International Framework for 
Liquidity Risk Measurement, 
Standards and Monitoring 
Increased Negative 
Jan. 7, 2013 Release of Basel III: The 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio and 
Liquidity Risk Monitoring 
Tools 
Decreased Positive 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Composition by Country, Representativeness, and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports in Panel A details for the composition of the sample. We present the number of banks 
by country, and we report on whether the banks headquartered in these countries are from the EU, the 
Eurozone, the GIIPS, or were subject to domestic liquidity regulation that precedes the new rules 
issued by the BCBS. We also present details about the representativeness of the sample for coverage in 
terms of total banking system assets, loans, and deposits, and we show how many banks fall under the 
SSM led by the ECB. Panel B presents descriptive statistics in terms of means and standard deviations 
by country for the bank and country-specific variables in our regressions.  
Panel A. Sample Composition for Country-Based Portfolio 
Banks EU Eurozone GIIPS 
Pre-Existing 
Domestic 
Liquidity Regulation 
Coverage in 
% of Total 
Banking 
System 
Assets 
Coverage in 
% of Total 
Banking 
System 
Loans 
Coverage in 
% of Total 
Banking 
System 
Deposits 
No. of 
Banks 
under 
the 
SSM 
Austria 6 YES YES NO NO 28.38% 34.97% 22.82% 2 
Belgium 2 YES YES NO NO 36.87% 42.45% 9.34% 2 
Cyprus 2 YES YES NO NO 42.90% 49.60% 38.74% 2 
Denmark 29 YES NO NO NO 60.89% 56.88% 56.21% n/a 
Finland 3 YES YES NO YES 13.18% 16.16% 8.30% 1 
France 7 YES YES NO NO 42.27% 32.72% 15.02% 6 
Germany 10 YES YES NO YES 54.89% 52.17% 25.75% 5 
Greece 7 YES YES YES NO 66.22% 69.01% 22.21% 5 
Ireland 2 YES YES YES NO 50.05% 62.88% 28.26% 2 
Italy 14 YES YES YES NO 68.70% 75.04% 49.38% 5 
Luxembourg 3 YES YES NO NO 9.11% 21.40% 3.78% 0 
Malta 2 YES YES NO NO 68.47% 84.90% 40.96% 1 
Netherlands 5 YES YES NO YES 34.89% 33.94% 11.22% 2 
Portugal 4 YES YES YES NO 52.23% 55.41% 21.87% 2 
Spain 7 YES YES YES NO 81.26% 82.58% 22.70% 5 
Sweden 4 YES NO NO NO 91.66% 90.56% 77.73% n/a 
Switzerland 13 NO NO NO YES 62.83% 58.84% 45.20% n/a 
United Kingdom 8 YES NO NO YES 67.85% 61.75% 60.31% n/a 
Total Banks 128 115 74 34 21 57.22% 56.97% 38.59% 40 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B. Means and Standard Deviations of Key Variables by Country and for the Full Sample 
 
  Austria Belgium Cyprus Denmark Finland 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
INTERBANK_RATIO 0.184 0.0914 0.2187 0.0893 0.0758 0.0608 0.1385 0.1074 0.1495 0.0785 
DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO  0.0067 0.0005 0.0085 0.0003 0.0111 0.0019 0.0036 0.0008 0.0040 0.0006 
LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO 0.22 0.1101 0.2943 0.069 0.2009 0.072 0.2691 0.3095 0.3050 0.2445 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO 0.6433 0.0879 0.3223 0.1859 0.7817 0.1179 0.7176 0.1846 0.4032 0.1934 
MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO 0.9851 0.3721 0.6396 0.927 0.9268 0.6981 0.9518 0.5425 0.9347 0.2916 
CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS 0.5894 0.109 0.2883 0.1758 0.7163 0.1082 0.6146 0.1643 0.3643 0.1989 
      
  France Germany Greece Ireland Italy 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
INTERBANK_RATIO 0.1715 0.1092 0.1390 0.0952 0.1691 0.1426 0.0836 0.0770 0.2062 0.2422 
DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO  0.0079 0.001 0.0047 0.0006 0.0123 0.0008 0.0065 0.0026 0.0109 0.0007 
LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO 0.5838 0.3121 0.4387 0.404 0.1405 0.0645 0.1541 0.0642 0.3291 0.2439 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO 0.3384 0.2306 0.5494 0.2428 0.6374 0.1018 0.5132 0.0536 0.4836 0.2044 
MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO 1.2679 1.2126 1.0688 0.6248 1.1005 0.4579 0.7969 0.7586 1.1835 1.193 
CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS 0.3250 0.2294 0.5051 0.2448 0.5759 0.0830 0.4490 0.045 0.4129 0.1823 
      
  Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Portugal Spain 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
INTERBANK_RATIO 0.0807 0.0498 0.0365 0.0343 0.0800 0.0508 0.1211 0.0790 0.0700 0.0749 
DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO  0.0013 0.0005 0.0099 0.0038 0.0053 0.0007 0.0082 0.0010 0.0042 0.0009 
LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO 0.8115 1.0784 0.31 0.0499 0.4250 0.8088 0.1864 0.0668 0.1916 0.1213 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO 0.3438 0.2656 0.8076 0.0242 0.4571 0.2523 0.5256 0.0788 0.4573 0.0633 
MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO 1.3519 2.0375 2.1406 1.1298 0.8612 0.5131 1.1049 0.7964 1.2427 0.5707 
CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS 0.4200 0.2089 0.8000 0.0312 0.4385 0.2340 0.4707 0.0839 0.4021 0.0565 
     
Sweden Switzerland 
United 
Total Kingdom 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
INTERBANK_RATIO 0.1295 0.0458 0.0902 0.1349 0.0658 0.0409 0.133 0.1306 
DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO  0.0038 0.0001 0.0025 0.0002 0.0069 0.0018 0.0059 0.0032 
LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO 0.4860 0.1802 0.8232 1.1353 0.4972 0.2753 0.3800 0.5111 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO 0.3441 0.0596 0.5338 0.2571 0.4954 0.2384 0.5496 0.2309 
MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO 2.2387 2.2738 1.6343 1.2738 1.3589 1.0619 1.1859 1.0129 
CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS 0.3111 0.0574 0.5201 0.2213 0.4507 0.2192 0.4964 0.2064 
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TABLE 3 
Market Reaction to Announcements Concerning Bank Liquidity Regulation 
Table 3 presents event study evidence for all seven BCBS announcements about the effect of 
bank liquidity regulation for a sample of banks from the EU and Switzerland. We present 
CARs (equal-weighted, EW, and market-weighted, MW) and CMARs (both EW and MW). 
Panel A uses the MSCI World as a proxy for the market portfolio and Panel B uses the MSCI 
Europe as a proxy for the market portfolio. The CARs and CMARs are estimated according to 
equations (1)-(4). BS P-value is the p-value for the average CAR and CMAR calculated 
according to 800 bootstrap simulations for the period Feb. 1, 2008–Feb. 28, 2013. For each 
simulation, we estimate the average CAR and CMAR according to equations (1)-(4) for seven 
(or four, for the liquidity-only events 1, 2, 3, and 7) randomly selected trading days. To 
consider only non-events trading days, we exclude days which fall in the 3-day window for 
the seven events. We randomly choose seven non-overlapping placebo events for the period 
Feb. 1, 2008–Feb. 28, 2013. This step is repeated 800 times. We compute the sum of the CAR 
and CMAR over all seven events for each of the 800 samples of placebo events. These steps 
ensure that the simulated data represent the distribution of CAR and CMAR under the null 
hypothesis, because they have been estimated for non-events trading days (for which, 
therefore, announcements related to bank liquidity regulation did not occur). The p-values are 
computed on the basis of the number of cases for which the CAR or CMAR is larger or 
smaller than the estimated value (2-tail tests). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Panel A. Market Portfolio Proxy: MSCI World 
Dependent variable CAR(–1,1) EW CAR(–1,1) MW CMAR(–1,1) EW CMAR(–1,1) MW 
     
Actual Events     
Total (all events) -0.0695*** -0.1319** -0.0666 -0.1548*** 
Average (all events) -0.0099*** -0.0188** -0.0095 -0.0221*** 
BS p-value (all events) 0.0100 0.0175 0.1049 0.0100 
Total (liquidity only bucket) -0.0430* -0.0766* -0.0484 -0.0785* 
Average (liquidity only bucket) -0.0108* -0.0192* -0.0121 -0.0196* 
BS p-value (liquidity only bucket) 0.0674 0.0674 0.1074 0.0899 
     
Placebo Events  (5 trading days earlier) 
Total (all events) 
-0.0234 0.0504 -0.0335 0.0463 
Average (all events) 
-0.0033 0.0072 -0.0048 0.0066 
BS p-value (all events) 0.3845 0.2372 0.5318 0.2122 
Total (liquidity only bucket) 
-0.0098 0.0551 -0.0198 0.0573 
Average (liquidity only bucket) 
-0.0025 0.0138 -0.0050 0.0143* 
BS p-value (liquidity only bucket) 0.6192 0.1099 0.6542 0.0999 
 
Panel B. Market Portfolio Proxy: MSCI Europe 
Dependent variable CAR(–1,1) EW CAR(–1,1) MW CMAR(–1,1) EW CMAR(–1,1) MW 
Actual Events     
Total (all events) -0.0527** -0.1003*** -0.0231 -0.1111*** 
Average (all events) -0.0075** -0.0143*** -0.0033 -0.0159*** 
BS p-value (all events) 0.0200 0.0100 0.6517 0.0075 
Total (liquidity only bucket) -0.0325* -0.0577* -0.0334 -0.0632* 
Average (liquidity only bucket) -0.0081* -0.0144* -0.0084 -0.0158* 
BS p-value (liquidity only bucket) 0.0799 0.0799 0.2797 0.0574 
 
Placebo Events  (5 trading days earlier) 
Total (all events) 
-0.0066 0.0783* -0.0059 0.0739* 
Average (all events) 
-0.0009 0.0112* -0.0008 0.0106* 
BS p-value (all events) 0.6866 0.0974 0.9988 0.0749 
Total (liquidity only bucket) 
-0.0023* 0.0656* -0.0141 0.0630* 
Average (liquidity only bucket) 
-0.0006* 0.0164* -0.0035 0.0158* 
BS p-value (liquidity only bucket) 0.8015 0.0674 0.7191 0.0574 
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TABLE 4 
Determinants of CARs and CMARs 
Table 4 presents tests that explain the effect of the bank-specific variables 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO, LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO, MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO, 
CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS, and the country-specific variables average 
INTERBANK_RATIO, DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO, EUROZONE membership, location in 
GIIPS, and LIQUIDITY_REGULATION on the cross-sectional variation of CARs and 
CMARs. Panel A uses the MSCI World as a proxy for the market portfolio and Panel B uses 
the MSCI Europe as a proxy for the market portfolio. The CARs and CMARs are estimated 
according to equations (1)-(4). We use random effects regressions with robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level. CORE_FUNDING_RATIO_DUMMY is a dummy that takes 
the value 1 if the CORE_FUNDING_RATIO is above the 75th percentile, and 0 otherwise. 
All bank-level variables, CARs and CMARs are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Constant included but not reported. t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Panel A. Market Portfolio Proxy. MSCI World 
 
Dependent Variable CAR(–1,1) CMAR(–1,1) CAR(–1,1) CMAR(–1,1) 
     
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO -0.059*** -0.052**   
 (-3.319) (-2.394)   
LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (4.268) (3.494) (3.815) (3.694) 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO_DUMMY   0.006 0.006 
   (0.889) (0.743) 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO × 
LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO 
  -0.025*** -0.029*** 
   (-2.703) (-2.589) 
CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.031*** 0.042*** 
 (3.961) (3.440) (2.592) (2.660) 
MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.192) (0.049) (0.684) (0.417) 
INTERBANK_RATIO 0.082*** 0.075** 0.069** 0.063** 
 (2.682) (2.374) (2.318) (1.976) 
DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (0.536) (0.250) (0.246) (0.017) 
EUROZONE -0.004* -0.003 -0.005** -0.004* 
 (-1.953) (-1.272) (-2.397) (-1.722) 
GIIPS -0.009 -0.009 -0.010* -0.008 
 (-1.549) (-1.376) (-1.691) (-1.439) 
LIQUIDITY_REGULATION -0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (-0.019) (-0.375) (1.367) (0.576) 
     
R2 0.0321 0.0308 0.0427 0.0437 
No. of obs.  754 754 754 754 
No. of banks 121 121 121 121 
 
Panel B. Market Portfolio Proxy. MSCI Europe 
 
Dependent Variable CAR(–1,1) CMAR(–1,1) CAR(–1,1) CMAR(–1,1) 
     
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO -0.064*** -0.060**   
 (-3.712) (-2.523)   
LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (4.136) (3.631) (3.555) (3.574) 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO_DUMMY   0.005 0.005 
   (0.788) (0.536) 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO × 
LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO 
  -0.024*** -0.025** 
   (-2.578) (-2.207) 
CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS 0.092*** 0.102*** 0.028** 0.043*** 
 (4.063) (3.450) (2.393) (2.584) 
MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 
 (0.365) (-0.258) (0.876) (0.101) 
INTERBANK_RATIO 0.090*** 0.091** 0.076*** 0.078** 
 (3.022) (2.524) (2.614) (2.125) 
DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO  0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 (0.700) (0.369) (0.352) (0.089) 
EUROZONE -0.006** -0.004 -0.007** -0.005** 
 (-2.115) (-1.561) (-2.429) (-1.989) 
GIIPS -0.010 -0.012 -0.010* -0.012* 
 (-1.580) (-1.627) (-1.694) (-1.694) 
LIQUIDITY_REGULATION -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.344) (-0.314) (1.101) (0.775) 
     
R2 0.0308 0.0284 0.0428 0.0419 
No. of ob.  754 754 754 754 
No. of banks 121 121 121 121 
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TABLE 5 
Determinants of CARs and CMARs for the Liquidity only bucket 
Table 5 presents tests to explain the effect of bank-specific variables 
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO, LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO, MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO, 
CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS, and country-specific variables average 
INTERBANK_RATIO, DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO, EUROZONE membership, location in 
GIIPS, and LIQUIDITY_REGULATION on the cross-sectional variation of CARs and 
CMARs. These tests are identical to those shown in Table 4, except for the fact that we focus 
on the Liquidity only bucket. Panel A uses the MSCI World as a proxy for the market 
portfolio and Panel B uses the MSCI Europe as a proxy for the market portfolio. The CARs 
and CMARs are estimated according to equations (1)-(4). We use random effects regressions 
with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. All bank-level variables, CARs and 
CMARs are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
Panel A. Market Portfolio Proxy: MSCI World 
 
Dependent Variable CAR(–1,1)  CMAR(–1,1)  
     
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO -0.080**  -0.086**  
 (-2.506)  (-2.237)  
LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO 0.010***  0.009***  
 (3.008)  (2.584)  
MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO -0.001  -0.000  
 (-0.628)  (-0.073)  
CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS 0.103***  0.110**  
 (2.632)  (2.336)  
INTERBANK_RATIO 0.046  0.059  
 (1.243)  (1.447)  
DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO  -0.004  -0.005  
 (-0.418)  (-0.539)  
EUROZONE -0.006**  -0.005  
 (-2.114)  (-1.524)  
GIIPS 0.005  0.005  
 (0.911)  (0.807)  
LIQUIDITY_REGULATION -0.008***  -0.008***  
 (-4.038)  (-3.497)  
Constant -0.018**  -0.017*  
 (-2.229)  (-1.859)  
     
R2 0.0250  0.0281  
No. of  obs.  401  401  
No. of banks 117  117  
 
Panel B. Market Portfolio Proxy: MSCI Europe 
 
Dependent Variable CAR(–1,1)  CMAR(–1,1)  
     
CORE_FUNDING_RATIO -0.090***  -0.086**  
 (-2.886)  (-2.236)  
LIQUID_ASSETS_RATIO 0.011***  0.009***  
 (3.031)  (2.578)  
MARKET_TO_BOOK_RATIO -0.001  -0.000  
 (-0.401)  (-0.063)  
CUS_DEP_TO_TOT_ASSETS 0.110***  0.110**  
 (2.886)  (2.335)  
INTERBANK_RATIO 0.056  0.059  
 (1.475)  (1.449)  
DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO  -0.010***  -0.008***  
 (-4.786)  (-3.496)  
EUROZONE -0.006**  -0.005  
 (-2.139)  (-1.523)  
GIIPS 0.007  0.005  
 (1.035)  (0.807)  
LIQUIDITY_REGULATION -0.007  -0.005  
 (-0.719)  (-0.539)  
Constant -0.013  -0.017*  
 (-1.467)  (-1.862)  
     
R2 0.0319  0.0281  
No. of obs.  401  401  
No. of banks 117  117  
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FIGURE 1 
Core and Periphery Countries in Europe 
Figure 1 plots a map with all countries in our sample. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain are considered periphery countries in the public debate about the Eurozone crisis. 
These countries experienced sovereign debt problems; they are highlighted in dark grey.  
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FIGURE 2 
Non-Eurozone Countries 
Figure 2 highlights the countries that are not members of the Eurozone (Sweden, Denmark, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). These countries are highlighted in dark grey.  
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FIGURE 3 
Countries in Europe with Pre-Existing Domestic Liquidity Regulation 
Figure 3 shows which countries had pre-existing domestic rules for the regulation of bank 
liquidity in place. Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Denmark had such 
legislation prior to the announcements of the BCBS in place. These countries are highlighted 
in dark grey.  
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FIGURE 4 
CARs and CMARs around the Event Dates 
Graphs A-D of Figure 4 illustrate the behavior of equal-weighted and market-weighted CARs 
and CMARs around a 3-day event window centred on the announcement date (represented 
with a vertical solid bold line). The solid line represents CARs (Graphs A and B) or CMARs 
(Graphs C and D) estimated using the MSCI World as a proxy for the market portfolio, while 
the dashed line represents CARs (Graphs A and B) or CMARs (Graphs C and D) estimated 
using the MSCI Europe as a proxy for the market portfolio. Graphs A and C use a market-
weighted portfolio of banks, while Graphs B and D use an equal-weighted portfolio of the 
bank stocks in our sample. 
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FIGURE 4 (continued) 
 
Graph A. Market-Weighted Portfolio CAR(–1,1) 
 
 
Graph B. Equal-Weighted Portfolio CAR( –1,1) 
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FIGURE 4 (continued) 
Graph C. Market-Weighted Portfolio CMAR(–1,1) 
 
 
Graph D. Equal-Weighted Portfolio CMAR (–1,1) 
  
 
